ABSTRACT: As conduits for ideas, values and geographical knowledge, the mass media contribute to the construction of regional order. Moscow-based media organisations with audiences in post-Soviet republics have been described as 'soft power tools' or 'information weapons' which aid the Russian state in its pursuit of regional dominance. However, a heavy focus on the agency of the Russian state obscures the important role that local actors and their motives often play in delivering Russian media content to large audiences in neighbouring countries. This article examines several major news providers which export content from Russia to Belarus and Ukraine, reaching large audiences thanks to partnerships that serve particular local interests and accommodate some local sensitivities. These news providers resemble mechanisms of neo-Gramscian regional hegemony, where actors in the 'periphery' are involved in perpetuating norms from the 'centre'. The article argues that Russia's political leadership, despite promoting consensual hegemony as its preferred regional order, has in fact undermined the type of media mechanisms that might have helped to sustain such an order.
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In November 2013, former Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko issued a stronglyworded plea for Europe to help his country 'escape' from Russia's orbit. Moscow is ready to use 'whatever means to maintain a sphere of influence', he wrote in the Financial Times, and Ukraine risked receding into 'a secondary state-like formation' if Russia succeeded in its geopolitical game. 1 Yushchenko's words suggest that a sphere of influence equates to the unjust, morally unacceptable denial of sovereignty to a weaker state by a more powerful one -a view which is shared by many contemporary commentators. 2 Russian leaders have never hidden their desire to maintain or increase their influence in the post-Soviet republics. In the 1990s the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was already identified as the territory where Russia's 'vital interests' (жизненные интересы, zhiznennyye interesy) were concentrated; preventing damage to these interests was explicitly prioritised. 3 During the 2008 conflict in Georgia, Russia's neighbours were famously described as its 'traditional sphere of interests' (традиционная сфера интересов, traditsionnaya sfera interesov) by then president Dmitriy Medvedev, who pledged to 'work very attentively' (очень внимательно работать, ochen vnimatelno rabotat) in these states as part of his five principles of foreign policy. 4 
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The Russian claim to a sphere of interests sounds a lot like a claim to a sphere of influence. 5 It has certainly been interpreted in that sense, pejoratively, by Western observers. Yet the establishment of a sphere of influence has not been publicly acknowledged as a goal by Russian policy-makers. The Moscow-centred regional order envisioned in so many Russian policy statements is never based explicitly on control and restrictions of sovereignty, but rather on 'natural mutual gravity', 6 arising from 'very close kinship of souls' (очень близкое родство душ, ochen blizkoye rodstvo dush). 7 In other words, Russian official discourse suggests that the post-Soviet republics and their citizens should welcome Russia's leadership on integration as a means to preserve the valuable 'cultural and civilizational inheritance' (культурно-цивилизационное наследие, kulturno-tsivilizatsionnoye naslediye) that supposedly unites the region. 8 In such a context, Russian regional influence, even dominance, would be rendered legitimate (and hence not a 'sphere of influence' in the pejorative sense) by the consent of everyone involved. 9 Russia's ambition to lead its neighbours through natural gravity, without need for coercion, brings popular geopolitics into play. Popular geopolitics refers to collective understandings of places and peoples and their social construction via the media and popular culture. 10 Studies of popular geopolitics have traditionally drawn attention to (and questioned) the 'taken-for-granted geographical reasoning' that occurs in the 4 content of movies, cartoons, video games, magazines, newspapers and other media formats. 11 It is argued that such reasoning can serve to legitimize the imagined boundaries that position a country's collective self in relation to friendly or hostile others. 12 Scholars writing about popular geopolitics regularly look at media discourse, visuals and audiences in particular national settings. 13 However, media content is often produced, disseminated and consumed across national borders -this is certainly true in the post-Soviet region, where media companies based in Moscow enjoy substantial transnational reach. The structures and interests which sustain cross-border media partnerships are not a traditional concern for scholars of popular geopolitics, yet the logic of popular geopolitics suggests that they might be significant for the regional and international order.
In most of the former Soviet republics, substantial numbers of citizens understand the Russian language, follow Russian celebrities, attend the Russian Orthodox Church or retain fond memories of the Soviet era when Russia was part of their homeland. The Russian state bases its hopes for legitimate regional leadership on such cultural ties generating sentiments of attachment in 'target' countries. This accounts for Russia's emphasis on 'cultural-humanitarian cooperation' (культурно-гуманитарное сотрудничество, kulturno-gumanitarnoye sotrudnichestvo), including support for Russian language learning, cultural exchanges and the free flow of media content from 5 Moscow to regional audiences. 14 Among analysts of post-Soviet politics, the regional impact of the Russian media has attracted particular attention. Russian media are described as 'soft power tools' or 'information weapons' wielded by the Kremlinsometimes to adverse, disruptive effect. 15 Russia's political leadership undoubtedly instrumentalises the media in pursuit of both domestic and foreign policy goals. 16 However, the purpose of this article is to look beyond the agency of the Russian state and highlight the facilitating role played by other, local actors in disseminating Russian media content within the post-Soviet region. It will be argued that these local actors and their interests have been integral to the process by which Russian norms, ideas and geographical knowledge have been delivered to mass regional audiences. The collaboration of actors in the 'periphery' in perpetuating norms from the 'centre' fits a model of regional neo-Gramscian hegemony. 17 In the Gramscian tradition, mass media are considered an institution which facilitates non-coercive dominance by propagating norms and ideas that undergird an established hierarchy of power.
The first part of the article draws on interviews conducted in 2011-2012 with the managers, editors and senior journalists of major media organisations that import/export news content from Russia to Ukraine and Belarus. The interviews 6 identify 'demand-side' factors which have traditionally sustained the presence of Russian news products in the media landscapes of Ukraine and Belarus, from common identities and the appeal of Russian celebrities among audiences to the material interests of Ukrainian businesspeople and the Belarusian state.
The second part of the article situates the interview findings in the context of changes to media regulation and the media environment which have occurred in Ukraine and Belarus during the past decade, up to the most recent period of conflict in Ukraine. By tracing the trajectory of Russian access to audiences in the two countries, the article demonstrates how the media's ability to convey ideas and norms from an aspiring regional hegemon to mass audiences in neighbouring states depends on accommodation of local sensitivities. Collaborating with local actors helps Russian media organizations to reach larger audiences than they would otherwise, but it also obliges them to accept limits on the narratives they disseminate. Recent experience suggests that when these limits are ignored, the outcome is often curtailment of access to the media market. Thus, when Russian media organisations have transmitted aggressive Kremlin-formulated narratives across borders without any regard for negative local reactions, it has undermined relationships and partnerships on which Russian hopes for 'consensual' regional hegemony depend. This leaves Russia more reliant on coercion to secure its regional ambitions. 18 
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The article proceeds by briefly reviewing the literature on regional hegemony and elaborating on the idea that mass media are a mechanism via which regional hegemonic order can be reinforced. It then provides some contextual information about the Belarusian and Ukrainian media environments, introduces the news providers included in the empirical study, and presents findings from the interviews.
The penultimate section explains how Russian media organizations have lost audience access when they have projected narratives without regard for negative local responses, particularly in Ukraine since 2014. A final, concluding section summarises the implications of this analysis for understandings of the media's role in the workings of regional influence and the nature of the post-Soviet regional order.
Regional hegemony and the media: theories and concepts
Hegemony is a contested concept in International Relations (IR). Prys identifies six different IR approaches to the phenomenon of hegemony -neorealism, the Theory of Hegemonic Stability (THS), long-cycle theories, world-system approaches, neoGramscianism and liberal hegemony theories. 19 Neorealism and THS share a materialist foundation in presenting hegemony as the 'direct consequence of an asymmetrical distribution of power', whereas the latter four approaches allow space for conscious decision-making and ideational dynamics. 20 Prys cites Sassoon to put 8 forward a consensus definition of hegemony as being 'a political order (whether global or regional) in which the hegemon's mode of thinking becomes dominant without a regular reference to violence'. 21 To render the concept more amenable to application at the regional level she situates hegemony on a continuum between 'domination' on the one hand (when a central state commands and extracts involuntary contributions from secondary states under a constant threat of force) and 'detachment' on the other (when the central state is focused on domestic or global politics, not the regional periphery).
Hegemony (whether regional or global) is better understood as a form of political order than as a 'strategy', as sometimes occurs. 22 To call it a strategy of the central state obscures the fact that hegemony depends as much on responses at the periphery as on decisions made at the centre. This is one of the main insights of the Gramscian perspective: that hegemony is achieved at least partly by consensual means, when a leading class 'universalizes… its norms and values, thereby establishing a political and ethical harmony between dominant and subordinate groups. A dominant class rules, but effectively with and over, rather than against, subaltern classes.' 23 9 Hegemony, as Cronin contends, 'is not an attribute of a particular country, but rather it is a type of relationship that exists among a group of countries'. 24 Hopf argues, following Gramsci, that hegemonic power is maximized to the extent that hegemonic ideas -those which advance the interests of the hegemon in the language of universal interests -become taken for granted by the dominated population. 25 Hegemonic orders are therefore reproduced not only through economic and security institutions or the persuasion of elites, but also via This account of how hegemony becomes established bears some resemblance to Nye's account of 'soft power', or power through 'attraction'. 27 Kearn asserts that soft power 'is most likely to be relevant in the presence of a hegemonic power, as it provides the ideational basis for the hegemon's perceived legitimacy'. 28 Nye's writings on soft power are criticised for lacking theoretical clarity, 29 so the most recent publications on the topic seek to rework the concept and address its limitations.
Feklyunina, for example, proposes an interpretation of soft power based on the 10 reception of narratives. 30 Her analysis underlines the agency of audiences, which are 'far from passive recipients of transmitted messages' and liable to arrive at varying interpretations of narratives projected from abroad. However, there has not yet been sufficient recognition that the media which transmit narratives can have agency too.
Many media organizations are far from being passive conveyers of messages; they may filter the narratives projected from one state to another to different degrees and in different ways.
The empirical contribution of this article is to highlight some of the lesser-studied actors, interests and complexities involved in the transmission of ideas via the media from a regional power to its less powerful neighbours. Acharya has called for regional worlds to be explored in their full diversity and interconnectedness. 31 The following sections address interconnectedness in the post-Soviet region's media industry and explain how and why certain connections have been sustained or broken.
'Dual-national' news providers within the media environments of Ukraine and Belarus
The media environments of Belarus and Ukraine have evolved in very different directions since the two countries acquired independence in 1991. Soon after Aleksandr Lukashenko became president of Belarus in 1994, he began to clamp down 11 on freedom of speech, placing loyal appointees in key editorial positions and developing highly restrictive legislation which makes it difficult for independent news providers to operate. 32 For over 20 years, tightly controlled state-owned news outlets have therefore dominated the Belarusian media environment -particularly television, which is where most Belarusian citizens obtain their news. 33 Belarusian TV viewers require a satellite dish to access channels with news programmes that are not controlled by their government. Belsat, a Polish-funded, Belarusian-language satellite broadcaster, appears to be the only TV channel that has substantially chipped into the state's news monopoly: it claims to have over 750,000 viewers (based on 2017 survey data). 34 The majority of Belarusians (over 60 per cent) can also get news online, where greater pluralism can be found. However, state-owned telecommunications firm Beltelecom controls international data transfers and can thus cut access to foreign websites when required; the state also has the ability and legal authority to block critical domestic websites, which it has done on multiple occasions. 35 The media environment in Ukraine is dominated by competing business interests rather than the state. As in Belarus, television is the most commonly used news medium. Ukrainian TV viewers can choose from numerous channels that belong to different Ukrainian 'oligarchs' and politicians (non-Russian foreign channels are available via cable but have negligible audiences). During certain periods, such as the 12 second presidential term of Leonid Kuchma, 36 the state authorities have exerted substantial pressure on editorial policy at the leading TV channels. The top channels are also known for engaging in self-censorship and tendentious reporting, particularly on issues that concern their owners' financial interests. Yet, online and print news organisations (such as Ukrayinska Pravda at Pravda.com.ua, and Zerkalo Nedeli at ZN.ua) have been providing good-quality journalism for many years, becoming more numerous over time, and Ukrainian legislation has generally been far more conducive to media freedom than legislation in Belarus.
Belarus and Ukraine thus constitute starkly different operating environments for Russian media organisations. Until 2014, Ukrainian legislation allowed Russian media companies greater leeway to operate without censorship than autocratic Belarus.
However, Russian media organisations faced more substantial competition in Ukraine than in Belarus, because Ukrainian domestic broadcasters were able to develop strong production standards with investment from their wealthy oligarch owners. Belarus and Ukraine have also followed quite different trajectories in their bilateral relations with Russia, which has had ramifications for Russian access to their media environments.
President Lukashenko has consistently supported the idea of Russia and Belarus being 'fraternal nations' (братские народы, bratskiye narody). Despite regular public spats with the Russian leadership about gas prices and oil imports, he has signed up willingly consequences. 38 Despite the differing political and commercial challenges of operating in Belarus and Ukraine, Russian media organisations have managed to maintain a high-profile presence in both countries. Media outlets in the post-Soviet republics which publish or broadcast news under Russian brand-names tend to be described in broad-brush terms as 'Russian media'. 39 However, some apparently 'Russian' channels and publications with large regional audiences could better be described as 'dual-national' media. Leading Russian broadcasters and publishers (both state and commercial) have entered into partnerships with local entities (both state and commercial) in order to deliver and sometimes tailor their products to viewers and readers in the post-Soviet 14 republics. Seven high-profile 'dual-national' media are listed in Table 1 (five cases from Belarus) and Table 2 (two cases from Ukraine); 40 these media are the main focus of empirical attention in this article. All of them export news content from Moscow under major Russian brands names. Instead, a handful of critical Russian reports were removed prior to broadcast and 19 Belarusian journalists were given the task of 'responding' to Russian verbal attacks with the Belarusian (official) point of view. 48 What sustains the transmission of Russian news via these 'dual national' media organizations, even during times of tension when Russian narratives are criticising the Belarusian leadership? The first explanation is audience demand, which some of the interviewees attributed to a common identity shared by Russians and Belarusians.
ONT's director of programming Olga Yakimenko said that a majority of viewers considered Russia and Belarus to be one country because of 'the long Soviet past, friendly ties and relations, and the fact that many have relatives and living in Russia'.
She added that ONT had never considered dropping Vremya from the schedule because 'viewers would be upset if it was taken off air'. 49 A second and related factor which explains the continued rebroadcasting of the Russian-made bulletins is the financial benefit accruing to the Belarusian state broadcasters. The Russian-made news bulletins have high ratings in Belarus, which means they attract high advertising revenues. Sergey Bulatskiy, director of NTVBelarus, said the channel was 'a commercial project above all' which was profitable thanks to the large audiences attracted by Russian content. 50 The Russian bulletins also allow the Belarusian channels to economize on the production costs of their own news 20 bulletins. The latter are able to run relatively few foreign news reports involving expensive foreign correspondents, because they can rely on the Russian channels to do such work for them. Bulatskiy pointed out that Belteleradiokompaniya lacked a network of permanent foreign correspondents due to financial constraints. 'Russia has far more', he said, adding that Belarusian viewers probably turned to the Russian news bulletins to learn about international events, as well as events in Russia. Ruslan
Poddubskiy, head of news at ONT, said the channel's Nashi Novosti bulletin had 'Moscow assistants, so to speak' for reporting big events in Russia or the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 51 Usually, Belarusian broadcasters only send correspondents to foreign events involving the Belarusian president or clear
Belarusian interests.
'Dual-national' tabloids: A balancing act between Moscow and officials or readers
At the 'dual-national' tabloids, staff in Minsk and Kyiv have responsibility for their own daily editorial decisions. Unlike the 'dual-national' TV channels described above, the In Ukraine, the interviewee from Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine said reporting on bilateral relations with Russia could be 'very difficult' given the sometimes contradictory views of Ukrainian readers and the Moscow head office. 58 Her comments
Belarusian and Ukrainian editions of Komsomolskaya Pravda and Argumenty i Fakty
indicated that the paper generally ended up acknowledging any obvious tensions, but In Belarus, the tabloids deliver profits back to Moscow, but profitability still appears to be the principal driving force behind their operations and editorial policy. As an interviewee from Komsomolskaya Pravda v Belorussii put it:
'Komsomolka is a business project. However people judge it due to its name and shareholders, pro-Kremlin or whatever, it is still a business project. So, the shareholders' interest lies in having a profitable business in Belarus, which operates in a stable way, with a growing readership, so the capital increases.' 65 The same interviewee stressed that the paper worked 'above all in the interests of the reader, because the reader buys the paper every day and if we do not answer his questions he simply stops buying'. A sceptic might wonder whether Komsomolka's Russian shareholders might also have political motives that were underplayed by 27 interviewee for reasons of normative acceptability -this cannot be ruled out.
However, the environment in authoritarian Belarus is such that a high-profile politically motivated media business independent of the Belarusian authorities would be unlikely to survive very long.
Unilateral projection of Russian media content and regional backlash
The 'dual national' media organizations discussed above constitute mechanisms of hegemonic norm transmission that are propelled by demand and pecuniary interests in In Ukraine, the main Russian state channels were first banned from cable networks in 2008 after they showed tendentious, misleading reports about political developments during the pro-Western presidency of Viktor Yushchenko. 67 That ban turned out to be difficult to enforce and fairly short-lived, but new bans imposed since early 2014 have been more durable and comprehensive. 68 Indeed, a whole raft of legislative and regulatory changes have been introduced in Ukraine since the 'revolution of dignity'
(революція гідності, revolyutsiya hidnosti) to reduce consumption of all kinds of Russian media content, as Russian propaganda has officially been acknowledged as a major threat to national security. 69 Banning cable transmissions of the main Russian federal channels was just the first step. 70 Dozens of other Russian channels were later added to the cable blacklist; 71 then the screening of Russian movies and TV series made since 2014 was banned as well. 72 The rules that require high quotas of content on Ukrainian TV channels to be made in Europe have been changed, so that Russianmade content no longer counts as European and is therefore being squeezed out of TV schedules. 73 Broadcasters must also abide by new language quotas stipulating that 75
per cent of content on all national TV channels must be in Ukrainian; 74 there are similar but slightly lower Ukrainian language quotas for radio broadcasts. The National
Council for TV and Radio Broadcasting has been given the power to impose hefty fines 77 By early 2017, the proportion of Ukrainians able to receive the main Russian federal channels had fallen to just 11-13 per cent (79 per cent of those who still had access were using satellite dishes and some people in the east could still get Russian channels via a terrestrial signal). 78 Other surveys show a sharp deterioration in Ukrainian attitudes towards Russian media; 79 by 2017 less than 2 per cent of Ukrainians said they trusted Russian TV reports about the conflict in Donbas. 80 
31
Thus, the Russian state's tendency to heavy-handedly project narratives which offend local interests in 'peripheral' countries has undermined the capacity of Russian media organizations to reach audiences in those countries. In Belarus, day-to-day Russian access to audiences has been maintained, but the Belarusian authorities have developed quite effective tools to censor or block Russian content which they find objectionable. In Ukraine, most of the major media conduits that used to disseminate norms and ideas from Russia have suffered substantial long-term damage since 2014. Another potential criticism of this study is that it focuses excessively on 'traditional' media organisations best known for their print and broadcast output (although it should be noted that all the media organisations discussed in the empirical section have an online presence too). For younger generations, social media -and the internet more generally -are increasingly important sources of news. Russian 'influence operations' on social networks have become a high-profile topic of global concern; 35 commentators are wondering whether Russia has 'mastered' social media platforms so well that it can now even swing elections in Western democracies. 81 If Russia has indeed developed effective online techniques for manipulating foreign public opinion, one could perhaps argue that access to mass audiences via traditional media in places like Ukraine no longer matters very much for its foreign policy ambitions. There are, however, good grounds to be sceptical of such a view. Social media audiences are by their nature fragmented. Russian content disseminated via social media is more likely to circulate among small, sympathetic audiences than to reach the broad audiences of a familiar national tabloid or cable TV channel. By targeting a sympathetic minority with inflammatory social media messages, Russian communicators can hope to achieve some 'disruption', which is often said to be their aim. 82 Yet an ability to disrupt neighbouring states by inciting minorities is not what Russia needs to achieve its vision of a hegemonic regional order. Rather, Russia needs the legitimacy that comes from mass popular acquiescence to Russian leadership. In Ukraine, the Russian state's communicative tactics are not serving this goal at all.
To conclude, cross-border media connections are an important feature of the twentyfirst century world which have implications for regional order, as the case of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine has illustrated. However, it is insufficient to study regional influence via the media exclusively from the perspective of the dominant state's 36 ambitions and agency. Rather, future analysis should pay due attention to the relationships and motives that sustain the transmission of media content across borders, from senders via deliverers to receivers.
